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Authenticity—dialogicality—recognition: an improbable journey 
Charles Taylor has made a remarkable attempt to recover the moral ideal of authenticity 
as opposed to the debased form of authenticity, that leads to individualism.1 He points at 
the dialogical nature of authenticity, and finally, in another work,2 justifies the need for 
recognition.  I want to show that the middle part of this chain of argument, dialogicality, 
if properly understood, cannot lead us to recognition in the sense Taylor ascribes to the 
latter. 
Taylor offers a strong historic argument for the authenticity.  He counterposes this notion 
to the medieval practice of assigning identity to an individual by the social position that 
she or he occupied.  The ideal of authenticity relates to understanding of one’s identity as 
an individualized one.  “Being in touch with our inner feelings,” writes Taylor, takes on 
independent and crucial moral significance.  “Before the late eighteenth century, no one 
thought that the difference between human beings had this kind of moral significance.”3  
Since then the idea that everyone should independently discover his or her originality and 
be true to it, takes roots in European culture.   
Taylor draws on Bakhtin’s ideas to develop a dialogical view of identity.  Our identity is a 
product of a continuing conversation with a group of “significant others,” he argues.  
“People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own.  Rather, we 
are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us.”4  But even later 
in life the significant others keep forming our identity, because they are included in our 
personal life experiences and our ongoing internal dialogues.  “If some of the things I 
value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes 
part of my identity.”5  Taylor uses Bakhtin’s notion of dialogicality to make the point that 
identity depends on recognition by others, and thus recognition is a vital human need.  So, 
if a member of a disadvantaged group is denied recognition as a member of the group, 
this may cause him or her to internalize a demeaning image of the self.  Therefore, the 
contemporary liberal society must recognize equal worth of different cultural groups 
instead of practicing the “cultural blindness” of the classical liberalism. 
My criticism of this  argument by Taylor is that his notion of authenticity rests on 
monological rather than dialogical assumptions; that his notion of dialogue is 
instrumental, and his notion of recognition is implausible. 
Taylor defines authenticity as being in touch with one’s inner feelings.  This is different 
from earlier moral views,  “where being in touch with some source – God, say, or the Idea 
of God – was considered essential to full being.  Only now the source we have to connect 
                                                 
1 Charles  Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
2 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
3  Taylor, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition,”  30. 
4  Taylor, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition,”  32. 
5  Taylor, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition,” 34. 
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with is deep in us.”6 He acknowledges that our significant others make a major impact on 
those “inner feelings,” and not only while the self forms, but throughout the whole life of 
an individual.  Yet it looks as if only when the voices of others are transferred within the 
self, only after the voices of others become inner voices, can they become authentic.  I fail 
to see how else one can reconcile the multitude of voices that make up the self with 
Taylor's understanding of authenticity.  How does one know which part of the self is 
authentic?  According to Taylor, one must listen to one's inner voices, and not let others 
simply define one’s identity.  He still thinks in terms of a single source, a single authority 
that defines what is authentic.  This authority is now inside, but it remains a singular one.  
This, from Bakhtin’s point of view, is a monological assumption. 
My position would be that the voices of others, both internalized and real voices of living 
individuals, must have some part in defining the self.  The internal voice within exists, 
but it only plays one part in the dialogue about the self, among the other, equally 
important voices.  I cannot accept a definition of authenticity tied to the internal-external 
opposition.  An individual who is completely in touch with his or her inner feelings, may 
also develop a false sense of self.  Inner feelings may be deceitful, just like social roles 
often are.  The criterion of authenticity is in the way different voices, inner and outer, 
interact in defining the self.  It is not in which voices are given priority.  I will explain this 
with Bakhtin’s idea of authentic self:   
In general, the reconciliation and merging of voices even within the bounds of a 
single consciousness – according do Dostoevsky’s plan and in accordance with his 
basic ideological premises – cannot be a monological act, but rather presumes the 
attachment of the hero’s voice to the chorus; for this to happen, however, it is 
necessary to subdue and muffle the fictive voices that interrupt and mock a 
person’s genuine voice.7  
Following Bakhtin, I admit that there are authentic voices of the self, and fictive ones.  
The authentic voice is one that is a part of a chorus in the fullest sense.  It is born on the 
boundary of the self with the outside world.  The fictive voices are those born outside of a 
genuine dialogue, either from the outer realm of the social world, or from the solitude of a 
disengaged self.  Authenticity is a function of dialogue.  It is not “being in touch with 
inner feelings,” but being in touch the world of other human beings.  Authenticity is being 
truly and permanently open towards the possibility that I am not what I thought I was.  
My authentic self does not belong to me in a sense, but is always shared by others.  I have 
no more authority to pronounce some deeper truths about myself, than other people who 
know me.  Or, in other words, I cannot describe myself if I do not know who listens.  
There is no authentic self without another, engaged self.  This means, among other things, 
that authenticity requires being different in different situations and with different people.  
Authenticity in Bakhtinian sense does not imply fixed sense of the self; to the contrary, 
authenticity is what is unfinished in me, it is what still remains to be said.  Thus any one-
                                                 
6 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 26. 
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time arrangement, including that proposed by Taylor within his framework of the politics 
of recognition, can not really help in attainment of the authentic self. 
My claim is that the notion of authenticity in Taylor’s interpretation is based on 
monological assumptions.  Such a charge may seem unwarranted, since he explicitly 
states his dialogical views drawing on Bakhtin.  However, Taylor uses Bakhtin’s notion 
of dialogicality in a curious way.  He says approximately the following: (1) the self is 
dialogical, that is it depends on others to form and to exist; (2) because of such 
dependency, the others may impose a demeaning or distorted image on the self; and 
therefore, (3) there must be a proper way to regulate such an influence, namely, the 
recognition.  This may very well be an interpretation of dialogue, but it certainly has very 
little in common with one of Bakhtin.  Bakhtin did not equate dialogue with just any kind 
of social influences.  Dialogue does not describe the social sphere of human existence; 
rather, dialogue constitutes a very specific form of social relations.  Indeed, the fact that 
oppressors often influence how oppressed view themselves, does not in any way establish 
existence of dialogue between the two groups.  Dialogue is a mutual relation, where 
participants have comparable rights to express their views.  Dialogue according to 
Bakhtin is a non-teleological concept.  It cannot be used for some further end, but is an 
end in itself.  Let us note that this covers both positive and negative (progressive and 
reactionary) ends, however one may define them. 
Even more important question remains unanswered, if the true recognition is at all 
possible, and if yes, how it is possible?  How do we tell the true recognition from 
misrecognition?  Taylor argues that recognition is not to be defined exclusively by the 
minority group in question, neither it is to be imposed from outside.  Rather,  true 
recognition requires “a fused horizon of standards” of different cultural groups.  This idea 
apparently originates with the hermeneutic concept of truth as negotiated through 
dialogue; a truth that is elusive, probably unachievable, but is still ideally singular.  
Bakhtin, in turn, offered a radically different idea of truth.  The truth requires a 
multiplicity of bearers; it simply “cannot be uttered with a single mouth.”8 Bakhtin’s 
concept of truth is polyphonic.  Truth is not a statement, but a multitude of simultaneous 
and  contradictory statements. 
Neither the image of a group, imposed by others, nor one produced from within, is 
capable of representing the complex reality of group identity,  and Taylor agrees with that 
much.  I would go further by suggesting that one true group identity cannot be produced 
even as a result of negotiations or “fused horizons” of  several groups.  There needs to be 
a multitude of identities, mutually contradicting but still meaningful if taken together.  Or, 
to express the same idea in different terms, an identity is not an internally consistent text, 
but a continuing dialogue where many different players address each other, while never 
achieving a consensus.  As with any other truth, the truth of group identity requires a 
multitude of voices.  Only taken at the same time, might they constitute the truth in 
Bakhtinian sense.  The most important here is that the different voices never merge, never 
reach a synthesis, or a “fusion of horizons.” They remain different, albeit always 
changing.   
                                                 
8 Bakhtin,  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 81. 
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But how does one distinguish polyphony from cacophony, when all the different  voices 
coexist but never touch each other? The multitude of representation by itself is not 
enough to constitute the truth.  This must be an engaged multitude, where every voice 
implicitly or explicitly answers to the challenges of another voice.  In other words, 
different representations only then constitute a dialogical whole, when they are part of the 
same conversation, even though they have differing opinions on the subject.  Another 
qualifier for polyphony is inclusion.  The truth is, in essence, everything everyone has to 
say on the subject, including “wrong” or even demeaning notions.  For instance, a certain 
minority group may be perceived by some as, say, of lesser artistic abilities.  The minority 
members consider themselves to be of equal artistic abilities.  In Bakhtinian world, 
neither of these two statements represent the truth.  The truth is there when real living 
people engage in dialogue around these two statements.  Now, for a true sense of identity 
the minority group must know and take into consideration demeaning stereotypes the 
majority imposes on them.  In some cases, minority identities form in direct response to 
such demeaning stereotypes.  But then, the truth of one’s group identity is taught to a 
young person not only by giving him or her the responses, but also by providing of the 
stereotypes and prejudices.  For instance, it is very hard to make sense of the civil rights 
movement without real voices of people who supported segregation.  Similarly, feminism 
looses all its edge without taking seriously  the ideologists of patriarchy.  To avoid 
arguing with a straw man, one has to develop an ability to keep the voice of an opponent 
alive, strong and talking in one’s own head.  This is how the voice of an opponent 
becomes part of one’s identity.  Building an identity by an oppressed group must not 
require forgetting of whatever the oppressor had or has to say about the group; it only 
requires end of self-exclusion, and beginning of dialogue.  Liberation does not entail 
expulsion of the oppressor’s voice from the oppressed group’s consciousness.  The voice 
of the oppressor remains included, but on different terms, as one among many.   
I was trying to show that any recognition is misrecognition, and that such 
misrecognitions, even of the most obviously demeaning kind are in fact part of group 
identities.  But even aside from the extremities, the truth of group identity consists of a 
multitude of  misrecognitions.  True and accurate recognition is impossible.  If you 
recognize another group exactly the way that group wants it (providing there is a 
consensus within the group – an improbable assumption), you deny this group your 
different, unique view of it.  Thus you do the disservice to the group’s identity.   
Taylor starts out with a strong notion of recognition, as a vital human need, as a process 
that would bring an end to unjust and demeaning identities imposed by the majority on 
cultural minorities.  He finishes, however, with a much more tempered, softer notion of 
recognition.  This softer recognition implies simply a presumption that other cultures may 
have something of worth to say to all of us, and that we need to stay respectfully engaged 
with other cultures in order to discover their unique achievements on their own terms.  
This in turn demands “a fused horizon of standards.”9  Excluding this last qualification, I 
find the “soft” version of the recognition very much acceptable and not very useful.  If 
recognition means only engagement and dialogue, then the notion itself loses its utility.  
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The notion of dialogue is quite sufficient here.  Instead of saying, “we should recognize 
the special rights of cultural minorities so their members can achieve authenticity,” one 
can simply say, “we must talk to each other both as individuals and as groups, because 
continuous dialogue equals authenticity.” 
Taylor’s argument is geared towards defining a political solution that would better serve 
the aims of authenticity by way of recognition.  In particular, he argues for a certain 
political model that would allow a culturally distinct society like Quebec to pursue some 
collective goals of cultural survival and at the same time to preserve fundamental human 
rights.  This implies that the politics of recognition is aimed at a semi-permanent solution, 
at a particular political system with its laws and procedures.  If this is so, I can understand 
how the dialogicality gets  lost in the process.  In turn, one may ask, what sort of a 
political solution I propose instead.  Rather than answering directly, I would like to 
comment that the presence of a specific political or otherwise practical implication does 
not necessary make a good philosophy.  And vice versa, lack of political suggestions does 
not indicate a poor philosophy.  Somehow political recommendations started to validate 
philosophy, and I am not sure if this is such a good arrangement.   
Admittedly, I do not propose any good solution of the Quebec question.  Perhaps a good 
solution in terms of a permanent or even semi-permanent political arrangement is 
impossible.  We do need to come to solutions from time to time.  However, one may 
regard such solutions as intrinsically temporary and always inadequate.  One can even 
regard the political solutions like laws, constitutional amendments, policies, etc.  as less 
important than a good conversation that leads to those solutions.  Maybe someday people 
will remember laws and judicial acts not for what they actually state, but for great debates 
they produced.  I suggest to understand the political space is the place of meeting.  How 
we divide money and power, is secondary and really not that important.  What we learn 
about each other and ourselves in the process is primary, and it is ultimately important. 
